This research is focused on the issue of differences in results received in elections for regional and federal legislatures that are held according to the proportional system. In particular, the question of whether the authorities' decision to favour the combination of synchronous regional and federal elections has proved effective. This research showed that, in simultaneous elections held at different territorial levels, United Russia always delivers better results at a federal level than at a regional level, while oppositional parties, conversely, perform better at a regional level than they do at a federal level. This can be explained by the phenomenon of strategic voting, according to which voters prefer to cast their votes for more stable and major players in federal elections, and that they are more likely to vote sincerely in regional elections. However, in separate elections these trends are not retained, and United Russia in particular has been noted to perform better in regional campaigns held during the inter-election period, than it did in the preceding and subsequent federal elections. Analysis of the degree of competitiveness showed that differences in the level of competitiveness in federal and regional elections are almost always lower in combined elections than in separate elections.
Introduction
This research is dedicated to a study of the differences between how the electorate votes in elections for regional and federal parliaments on party lists, and also looks at the influence on these differences of having different types of elections held on the same day. The first half of this research will analyse the trend towards a reduction in the number of election days in the regions and the gradual transition to having a single election day. To this end, an election calendar for regional and federal parliaments from 1991 to 2016 will be drawn up, and conclusions will be drawn regarding the number of times the regional elections coincide with federal campaign dates. This section will show the presence of a clearly demonstrated trend towards combining election days, which results from an initiative by the Russian authorities to combine federal and regional elections as more effective in their interests.
The second and third sections will analyse the extent to which this policy has been a success, and whether it leads to an increase in electoral support for the party of power and also to a reduction in competition between the parties at other types of election. To achieve this, the second section will include an analysis of the results for Russia's four main political parties (United Russia, KPRF, LDPR, Just Russia), in various types of election from 2003 to 2016. To ensure the differences are identifiable, regional elections held on the same day as federal elections will be analysed separately. Accordingly, elections held in the gap between federal election campaigns will also be analysed separately. Where elections take place simultaneously, the difference will be identified between electoral support for the 'party of power' in regional and federal campaigns, and electoral support for opposition parties at these elections, based on a comparison of the percentage of votes received by the same parties on the single voting day.
These same differences will be identified for inter-election periods based on party results in regional elections in a particular year, and also -for comparison -in the previous and subsequent years' federal elections. To simplify the process, we analyze differences in electoral support for each party at different types of election each year (the difference in regional and federal results on a single voting day for simultaneous elections, and the difference between a regional result and the preceding and subsequent federal result for separate elections). Thus, it will be possible to identify which political actors perform better in regional elections, and which perform better in federal elections. In addition, party voting trends from 2003 to 2016 will be analysed for both regional and federal elections, and inter-regional differences in the parties' electoral support will be identified.
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The third section will focus on the level of competition in different types of election, as calculated by two different methods: the 'effective number of parties' (ENP) (Laakso, Taagepera 1979) ; and Juan Molinar's alternative effective number of parties' index (Molinar 1991) . Using the above indices to analyse elections held simultaneously will enable us to differentiate between the mobilisation of pro-government and opposition electorates in regional and federal elections (using an analysis of the difference in ENP, calculating equivalent differences in electoral support for political parties). For the inter-election period, we will analyse changes in ENP in the period between federal election campaigns to examine whether there are significant differences in the level of competitiveness in simultaneous and separate elections. In addition, we will analyse overall ENP trends in the period under examination, i.e. from 2003 to 2016, and national trends and inter-regional differences will be identified.
In our work we apply the concept of "strategic voting", based on the understanding that "A voter is considered to be "strategic" or "sophisticated" if she maximises expected utility by casting a ballot for a candidate who does not rank first in her preference ordering" (Ferrara et al. 2005 ). Thus, voters vote strategically when they try to maximise the effect of their vote, rather than following their political or ideological preferences. Thus a voter may vote for more established, weightier political figures, even though his/her personal preference may lie with weaker candidates or smaller parties. Strategic voting as a concept has been the subject of a significant volume of research regarding mixed electoral systems, in which the differences between strategic and sincere voting patterns in proportional and plural (SMD -single member district) systems was analysed (Farquharson 1969; McKelvey and Ordeshook 1972) .
In our research, we expand the application of "strategic voting" as a concept to reflect the differences between voting in simultaneous elections by party lists and in SMD, as this was the approach taken in Western literature, and to reflect the differences between regional and federal voting (both on single election days and those held separately) in the proportional electoral system. Our hypothesis is that, when voting in federal elections, voters are more inclined to strategic electoral behaviour, and consequently, when voting at a regional level, voters are more inclined to sincere electoral behaviour. This hypothesis will be tested using empirical data, including election results for the four main political parties in Russia in elections held at different levels from 2003 to 2016.
Other key concepts applied in this study include that of the nationalisation and inflation of party systems. A high level of nationalisation of politics involves national socio-political divides (Lipset, Rokkan 1967) and is more important for voters than local splits and conflicts (Caramani 2004) . Thus, the level of diversity and extent of competition evident in elections in different regions of the country are directly dependent on the level of nationalisation of the party system: "Competitiveness is here an indicator of homogeneous electoral forces across the country" (Caramani 2004) . If there is a high level of nationalisation, then all regions of the country will display similar features regarding to the party system and citizens' electoral behaviour, coinciding with the characteristics of the broader national party systems.
Inflation is understood as the opposing force to nationalisation, in this instance a difference appears between the levels of competitiveness in regional and national elections (Cox 1999) ; and competitiveness at a national level, under the approach to assessing inflation accepted in Western literature, can only be larger, and the focus is on the degree of this difference.
Western scholars use only national elections to measure the level of inflation, both overall and region-to-region.
As with strategic voting, in this research we will take our own approach to studying inflation. Instead of the regional characteristics of national elections, we will use results from elections to regional parliaments in dozens of constituent entities of the Russian Federation.
Under this approach, competitiveness in elections held at different territorial levels may differ significantly, and it is interesting to gain an understanding of where there is more competitiveness -at national elections or regional elections. To measure this competitiveness we use indicators of the effective number of parties calculated in two variants: a classical ENP indicator as developed by Laakso and Taagepera, and the one further developed by Juan Molinar, in which competitiveness is calculated taking into account the role of the dominant party. Thus, third section will analyse the comparative competitiveness in regional and national elections from 2003 to 2016, and will identify the dominant trend in contemporary Russia.
If the electoral support indicators for the party of power and opposition parties are very similar or close to identical (if the difference in percentage of the vote received for all or the majority of parties at regional and federal elections is close to zero), and if the level of competitiveness in regional and federal elections is close to identical (prevailing trend towards the nationalisation of the systems), then we can talk about the gradual institutionalisation of Russia's party system in its contemporary iteration.
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Towards a single election day
The first federal elections took place in Russia in 1993, and the first mass wave of elections to regional parliaments started in 1994. However, some regions opted to elect deputies in 1993 or even in 1992. The first and only elections to a regional parliament in post-Soviet Russia in 1992 took place in the Republic of Khakassia. Then, on 12 December 1993 elections to the State Duma were held. Regional elections were held in the following 10 constituent entities of the Russian Federation at the same time as the State Duma elections: the Republic of Altai, the Republic of Mari El, the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia), the Republic of Tuva, the Arkhangelsk Region, the Volgograd Region, the Moscow Region, the Tula Region, Moscow City, and the Komi-Permyak Autonomous District. There were no separate elections in 1993.
In 1994 we finally saw the first real wave of elections to regional parliaments in the constituent entities of the Russian Federation -with elections held in 62 regions. These elections were held on different days -the most popular dates were: 20 March 1994 and 27 March 1994, however many regions went to the polls on other days (30 January, 13 March, 10 April, 29 May, 28 June, 20 November, 27 November etc). Therefore one could not talk about the existence of any uniformity regarding election date, and in the overwhelming majority of cases the regions did not, at this stage, see federal and regional elections coincide.
In 1995, regional elections took place in 10 constituent entities. Most did not coincide with the dates of federal elections, and were held on very different dates (22 January, 5 March, 10 June etc). On 17 December 1995 elections were held to the State Duma, and at the same time parliamentary elections in Adygea and Ulyanovsk Region were held, as were by-elections in Primorye Territory (low turnout had prevented regional parliament elections being held before then). Thus, in 1995, elections took place in 10 constituent entities, while only three campaigns coincided with federal elections.
In 1996 elections were held for regional legislatures in 27 constituent entities. The dates chosen for these elections covered a huge range: 31 March, 16 June, 6 October, 24 November, 1 December, 8 December, etc. There was an occasional overlap with the 1996 presidential election campaign held in June. In 1997, elections took place in 32 regions. Election dates were mainly set for December (7, 14, 26, 28 December) , however in many regions elections took place on other dates (31 March, 29 June, 12 November etc). In 1998, elections took place in 15 regions.
Most were in March (22 or 29 March) however this cannot be described as complete unity, as for example in Lipetsk Region regional elections took place on 31 May.
In 1999 elections were held in 12 regions, and in 4 cases were held alongside federal elections, but the remaining 8 saw regional and federal elections held on different dates (28 February, 7 March, 14 March etc Later, Russia's single election date was set for autumn, making it possible to increase the number of simultaneous elections. In 2012, elections to regional legislatures took place in 6 constituent entities, and they were all held on 14 October. In 2013, elections to regional legislatures took place in 16 constituent entities, and all were held on 8 September. In 2014, elections to regional legislatures took place in 14 regions, and all were held on 14 September. In 2015, elections to regional legislatures took place in 11 constituent entities, and all were held on 13 September.
The next federal elections were held in 2016, and there were no separate regional 
5) Khabarovsk Territory. Elections in Khabarovsk Territory have never been
held the same year as federal elections, they were held in: 1994, 1997, 2001, 2005, 2010 and 2014.
6)
Belgorod Region. Similarly, elections in Belgorod Region have never been held the same year as federal elections, they were held in 1994, 1997, 2001, 2005, 2010 and 2015.
7)
Bryansk Region. Elections in Bryansk Region have always been held in a different year from federal elections, in 1994, 1996, 2000, 2004, 2009 and 2014 .
8)
Voronezh Region. Similarly -1994 Similarly - , 1997 Similarly - , 2001 Similarly - , 2005 Similarly - , 2010 , and 2015.
9)
Ivanovo Region. Similarly -1994 Similarly - , 1996 Similarly - , 2000 Similarly - , 2005 Similarly - , 2008 Similarly - , and 2013 .
10) Irkutsk Region (including the previous constituent entity of the Russian
Federation -Irkutsk Region, before unification with Ust-Ordynsk Buryat Autonomous Region). Similarly -1994 Similarly - , 1996 Similarly - , 2000 Similarly - , 2004 Similarly - , 2008 Similarly - , and 2013 11) Kaluga Region. Similarly -1994 Similarly - , 1996 Similarly - , 2000 Similarly - , 2004 Similarly - , 2010 Similarly - , and 2015 12) Kostroma Region. Similarly -1994 Similarly - , 1996 Similarly - , 2000 Similarly - , 2005 Similarly - , 2010 Similarly - , and 2015 13) Kurgan Region. Similarly -1994 Similarly - , 1996 Similarly - , 2000 Similarly - , 2005 Similarly - , 2010 Similarly - , and 2015 14) Magadan Region. Similarly -1994 Similarly - , 1997 Similarly - , 2001 Similarly - , 2005 Similarly - , 2010 Similarly - , and 2015 15) Novosibirsk Region. Similarly -1994 Similarly - , 1997 Similarly - , 2001 Similarly - , 2005 Similarly - , 2010 Similarly - , and 2015 16) Rostov Region. In Rostov Region, elections were held in 1994 and 1998. -1994, 1997, 2001, 2005, 2010, and 2015. 18) Sakhalin Region. Similarly -1994 Similarly - , 1996 Similarly - , 2000 Similarly - , 2004 Similarly - , 2008 Similarly - , 2012 Similarly - and 2017 19) Chelyabinsk Region. Similarly -1994 Similarly - , 1996 Similarly - , 2000 Similarly - , 2005 Similarly - , 2010 Similarly - , and 2015 20) Yaroslavl Region. Similarly -1994 Similarly - , 1996 Similarly - , 2000 Similarly - , 2004 Similarly - , 2008 Similarly - , and 2013 21) Nenets Autonomous Region. Similarly -1994 Similarly - , 1996 Similarly - , 2000 Similarly - , 2004 Similarly - , 2009 and 2014.
22)
Yamal-Nenets Autonomous Area. Similarly -1994 Similarly - , 1996 Similarly - , 2000 Similarly - , 2005 Similarly - , 2010 , and 2015. one date for all regional elections. 2011, a no less crucial year, saw the first significant number of regions moving to adopt a combined regional and federal election day, and then there is 2016, a groundbreaking year in which all regions that held elections to their legislature did so at the same time as federal elections.
Given this trend, we can conclude that the unification of the election calendar, the favouring of a single election day, is part of government policy. Combined elections are, by definition, convenient from an organisational point of view, the campaign expenses are significantly reduced and they are cheaper for the government as well. However, is the key factor in this success a growth in support for the 'party of power' in combined elections? And will this lead to a fall in the level of competitiveness? These are questions that we will answer in the following two sections.
Electoral support for political parties in elections held at different territorial levels Simultaneous elections
This section considers the difference in party votes when federal and regional elections are held on one day. In 2003, regional elections took place in 11 constituent entities of the Russian Federation, of which 7 regions held joint federal elections on 7 December 2003.
The average proportion of the vote that went to United Russia based on data from 7 constituent entities amounted to 46.93%, the average proportion of the vote for United Russia in federal elections in the same 7 constituent entities amounted to 51.8%. Thus, the difference (between regional and federal figures) amounts to 4.86 points. The average vote for the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF), according to information from 7 constituent entities amounted to 12.94%, and 11.06% at federal elections in the same 7 constituent entities (a difference of +1.89 points in favour of regional elections). The average vote for the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) in 7 regions amounted to 9.45%, and 11.02% in federal elections in the same constituent entities -a difference of 1.5 points.
As these calculations show, the largest negative difference (when regional and federal elections are compared) can be seen in the United Russia statistics. This testifies to the fact that support for United Russia in regional elections is lower than during federal elections held simultaneously. The difference in statistics for the LDPR is also negative, although less markedly so than for United Russia. At the same time, the Communist Party boasts greater support at regional elections than in federal elections. Moving on, we will consider the two most recent federal election campaigns. In 2011, regional elections took place in 38 constituent entities, of which 24 regions held them together with federal elections on 14 December.
The simple average for United Russia in regional elections, according to data from 24 constituent entities, was 43.30% while in federal elections in those same regions the figure was 43.59%. This is a difference of -0.3.
The KPRF's simple average result, according to data from 24 constituent entities, was 19.70%, while in federal elections in those same constituent entities, the figure was 19.14%, a difference therefore of +0.56.
The simple average for the LDPR in regional elections was 14.96%, against 14.04% in federal elections -a difference of +0.92.
And finally, the simple average for Just Russia in regional elections was 16.64% against 15.76% in federal elections -a difference of +0.88.
At the same time, we see increased electoral support for parliamentary opposition parties. There is also a strengthening trend towards combining federal and regional elections. Given these circumstances, the difference in electoral support for parties at regional and federal elections reduces -remaining close to zero for the party of power and for parliamentary opposition parties. Nonetheless, the difference for United Russia remained negative, which as before indicates that there is greater support for the party in federal elections than in regional elections.
By contrast, the differences for the KPRF, LDPR, and Just Russia parties remain positive, meaning that they garner greater support in regional elections. However, both positive and negative differences for all parliamentary parties in 2011 amounted to less than one percentage point, which, when seen in the context of the electoral changes that took place at a system-wide level, indicates a trend of moving towards the gradual nationalisation and institutionalization of Russia's party system. for Just Russia based on data from these 39 constituent entities was 9.01%, and 6.97% in the federal elections held at the same time -a difference of +2.04.
In the 2016 parliamentary elections we again see nationwide growth (although not particularly intense) in electoral support for United Russia, and an overall fall in electoral support for parliamentary opposition parties (however we did note that, in the regional sample data we analysed, there was also an increase in support for the LDPR). This process, our research indicates, was accompanied by a new increase in the difference between regional and federal electoral support for almost all parties. United Russia retains its negative difference -and in fact it significantly increases compared to 2011. The KPRF keeps its positive difference, and also notes a significant increase. The LDPR also sees a positive difference, but is the only party for which this difference falls. Just Russia continues to win greater support in regional elections, increasing this gap. These results indicate the ongoing trend towards greater support for the party in which its regional results were lower than its federal results, which confirms the notion that it has a badly developed regional network.
In order to clarify the conclusions reached regarding the relationship between the Russian electorate's voting behaviour in simultaneous federal and regional elections, we have also identified the overall result for each party at regional elections. The overall result is calculated by dividing the number of votes received by a party in particular regional sample by the total turnout in those regions. Unlike the simple average presented above, this result reflects the region's size, and is interesting in that it shows the overall volume of support for a party in the sample under observation. By comparing overall results in regional and federal elections, we are The simple average for those 24 regions was 14.04%, the overall figure for the same regions - Overall, on the basis of the data received it is not possible to draw concrete conclusions about the existence of a clearly defined dependence of electoral support for these political parties on whether or not combined federal and regional elections are held in specific regions. The level of support may also depend on nuances relating to the concrete sample of regions that held combined elections. Therefore one can only draw general conclusions that combined elections themselves have not led to any increase in United Russia's support, which corresponds to the 23 conclusion we reached above, that United Russia performed worse in combined regional elections than in federal elections.
In other words, holding regional elections at the same time as a federal election campaign can even have a negative impact on the 'party of power' performance.
Separate federal and regional elections
Before moving to an analysis of regional election results in the inter-election period, and their differences from federal election results, we would like to note nationwide voting trends in federal elections. 
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We have made a similar chart for the period, comparing the results for regional party support with federal results in the subsequent 2011 elections. This chart (see Fig. 10 ) shows how the difference for regional elections [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] gradually reduces over the period, and falls into the negative, when in regional elections in spring 2011 United Russia received even fewer votes than in the federal elections that followed later that year in those same regions. The difference between separate regional elections and federal elections in spring 2011 was -4.6 points, while in combined elections the same year this figure was -0.3. Thus it follows that, in the 2011 federal elections, despite the decline in United Russia's ratings, the combination of elections acted as a corrective, since support for United Russia could have fallen further as the preceding regional elections showed. The difference for the KPRF throughout this period remained in the negative, i.e. in regional elections the KPRF received fewer votes than in the 2011 federal elections, during which it performed better.
The LDPR and Just Russia also saw a gradual reduction in this difference and a gradual movement towards the 2011 results, however, in 2011 these parties saw the difference moving into the positive -meaning that their results in the regional elections of spring 2011 were higher than in the federal elections the same year in the same regions.
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We provide a similar graph for the inter-election period over the years 2012-2015. This period was not extended to include 2016, as that year did not see any regional elections held separately. than at regional elections. Opposition parties, in turn, receive a higher percentage of the vote in regional elections than in federal elections. This can be explained by the concept of strategic voting as described in this research. Voters in federal elections tend to vote for a tried and tested major political player, able to ensure state stability. In regional elections, however, they are more likely to vote more sincerely according to their personal preferences and considering local problems associated usually with regional authorities.
So, the regional agenda is usually more problematic for the electorate, which is why the level of discontent with the authorities is higher at a regional level than at a federal level. Voters who cast their ballots strategically usually select the 'party of power' in federal elections and opposition parties in regional elections. Usually, this is particularly clearly pronounced in combined elections, in which the theory of strategic voting defines the relationship between the different types of vote that are cast on any one day.
Interestingly, these observations do not extend throughout the entire inter-election period,
i.e. they do not apply to those regional elections that do not take place alongside federal elections. We cannot claim that United Russia always receives a lower percentage of votes in regional elections in the inter-election period than in federal elections before and after the period. 
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Degrees of competitiveness in elections held at different territorial levels
Simultaneous elections
In this section, we calculated the effective number of parties (ENP) using both LaaksoTaagepera and Juan Molinar methods. In order to analyse the difference in degrees of competitiveness, we compare data for regional and federal elections -concurrently and in the inter-election period -by calculating the simple average ENP for the regional sample each year.
Let us start by analysing the degree of competitiveness in combined federal and regional elections. We will calculate the indicators of electoral inflation in our version, i.e. in the form of the difference in degree of competitiveness, by using the difference between the average regional and federal ENP. The higher the ENP, the higher the election competitiveness, and consequently a positive difference indicates that competitiveness may be higher at a regional level. LT denotes the Laakso-Taagepera index and JM -the Juan Molinar index. We also compare the same data using the Molinar ENP method (Fig. 14) . This graph is similar to the previous one; the only difference is that the range of differences is significantly lower. In addition, the Laakso-Taagepera index gave us a significant fall in the difference in competitiveness from 2007 to 2011, when it moved from positive to negative. Using the Molinar index for all elections under review, we always see higher competitiveness at a regional level than at a federal level. Clearly, this is due to differences between the two methods. The Laakso-Taagepera index is more sensitive to the number of election participants (some of them receiving extremely small results), while the Molinar index works better when the elections involve one clearly dominant player.
Based on these charts, one can conclude that the difference in degree of electoral competitiveness for combined elections in different territorial levels is rather small. But the 33 trends in differences are of significant interest. 
Separate federal and regional elections
We will now move to an analysis of the trends in difference in degree of competition in We will now analyse the same period in comparison with the following 2007 elections (Fig. 16) . We will now look at the inter-election period of 2008-2011. First we will consider the graph that shows degree of competitiveness in regional elections in comparison with the preceding federal elections of 2007 (Fig. 17) . If we compare this same period with the subsequent federal elections of 2011, then the picture appears quite different (Fig. 18 ). It does, despite this, in fact support the same conclusions. First, virtually all difference indicators are negative, which confirms the fact that competitiveness in these regional elections was still lower than in the 2011 federal elections.
However, the later elections were held, the lower the amplitude of difference between regional and federal elections, therefore -we see that competitiveness has gradually increased in the regions, close to the level reached in 2011. The Laakso-Taagepera index shows consistently higher results than the Molinar index, and supports the thesis that competitiveness in spring 2011 in the regions was even slightly higher than in federal elections later that year.
Comparing the range of differences in ENP in a single inter-election period with the differences seen during simultaneous elections at federal and regional levels, one can note that in 2007 the difference for simultaneous elections was clearly smaller, as anticipated. However, in 2011 the difference for separate elections was smaller than for simultaneous elections. Therefore there is no clear evidence to support the idea that simultaneous elections always lead to closer competitiveness indicators than separate elections, although that is usually the case.
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Now we will consider the situation in the inter-election period of 2012-2015 in comparison with the federal elections of 2011 (Fig. 19) . These calculations and analysis do not permit us to come to clear conclusions about the dependence of competitiveness on simultaneous or separate elections at different levels. It is not surprising that, in most instances, the degree of competitiveness in simultaneous elections is higher than in separate elections, i.e. simultaneous elections in the regions echo both the national features of the party system and citizens' electoral behaviour. This trend is not only due to combining elections, it is also rooted in the ongoing process of nationalisation of the party system -which is further stimulated by the Kremlin through combining election campaigns.
As for inflation, i.e. the gap between the competitiveness seen at a regional and federal level, and the extent of this difference, one can note that the closing of this gap is a clear trend,
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which also corresponds to the nationalisation of the party system. It should also be noted that Russia does not display any general trend regarding the growth or contraction in the degree of competitiveness in regional elections compared to federal elections. Some regular features can be identified as part of an analysis of a particular inter-election period, but they are then subject to further change.
Conclusion
This research addressed the issue of the effectiveness of the government's approachfavouring the combination of elections held at different territorial levels on a single day; in particular -federal and regional elections. Effectiveness in this sense means the ability to deliver increased support for the party of power and a reduction in competitiveness as a result of combining elections. In order to test these hypotheses, we applied specially processed party President Vladimir Putin's third term, regional elections have become much less beneficial for the opposition than before.
In conclusion, during simultaneous elections at different territorial levels, United Russia always receives more votes at a federal level than at a regional level. We link this with the strategic voting phenomenon, in which voters are more inclined to cast their votes for a more stable and weighty player. We believe that the federal election campaigns prompt people to vote strategically, and that they are more likely to vote sincerely in regional elections. Nonetheless,
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after 2012, despite the more problematic nature of the regional agenda, the vote for United Russia in regional elections started to yield very good results, which testifies to the fact that strategic voting for this party probably extended to a regional level in the election campaigns.
Then we compared degrees of competitiveness in parliamentary elections at different territorial levels, both for simultaneous elections and for inter-election periods. Unlike the previous section of our research, here it was not possible to receive any clear picture from the results attained. In addition, the differences in degree of competitiveness were almost always lower in combined election than in separate elections. As for the influence expressed by the campaign level, it can be concluded that a higher degree of competitiveness is seen at the regional level than at the federal level.
Thus, the more frequent combination of elections makes it possible to extend the common features of a national party system to all constituent entities of the federation, a process that can be termed the nationalisation of Russian politics. However, the structure and degree of competitiveness may change in different directions. As research shows, one cannot say there has been any consistent or dynamic reduction in the differences in degrees of competitiveness at federal and regional elections. A reduction in the difference or gap between these indicators would mean that we could discuss the gradual institutionalisation of Russia's party systems, but this has not yet taken place. If the entire period under consideration is examined as related to the party system and the dominant party, then there is no clear unidirectional trend towards synchronous political development of the country and its regions, which is, in fact, unstable and often changes course.
